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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores Kazuo Ishiguro’s 2005 novel Never Let Me Go, with a focus on the way the 
novel considers large questions concerning the “meaning” of human life and the nature of 
“human condition” as Ishiguro calls it in interviews discussing his novel, using language and 
terminology provided by phenomenologist and philosopher Martin Heidegger in his seminal 
work Being and Time. This thesis builds on these questions to consider the complex ways that 
the concept of “dignity” as shown through the experiences of clones who have socially 
predetermined lifespans complicates issues surrounding the inevitability of death, the 
uncanniness of clones and organ donation, and the reluctance to resist circumstances that cannot 
be changed. Ultimately, the novel provides a way of approaching a kind of bittersweet 
hopefulness in moving towards death, despite the crushing weight of its, and our, unalterable 
circumstances. 
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Making Meaning: Death, Dignity, and Dasein in Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go 
Introduction 
 Kazuo Ishiguro’s 2005 novel Never Let Me Go presents a dystopian vision of a reality 
very near our own in which clones are generated, brought to adulthood, and then subjected to 
giving their organs through donation before their deaths at around the age of thirty. In Never Let 
Me Go, Ishiguro makes use of the dystopian genre and the idea of a clone underclass as a 
backdrop for a muted, beautiful, and quite sad exploration of what makes our human lives have 
meaning at all or to what extent those meanings can have a wider or external importance. This 
thesis will explore the way the novel brings the reader into a position of identifying with the 
narrator Kathy H. and the “clone class” instead of seeing the clones as “other” and how this 
feeling of relation allows for a parallel of our own natural human lives with those of the clones. 
This framing offers a new angle for examining the qualities of human life which populate lived 
experiences with “meaning,” which this thesis will define in relation to Martin Heidegger’s 
concept of Dasein, or a “being in the world.” 
 In a 2006 interview with Cynthia F. Wong and Grace Crummett, Ishiguro shares aspects 
of his process of writing Never Let Me Go, saying: “I was always trying to find a metaphor for 
something very simple—it sounds rather grand—but, a metaphor for the human condition, and 
for coming to terms with the fact that we’re not immortal, that we’re here for a limited time” (“A 
Conversation with Kazuo Ishiguro” 215). The specific metaphor of cloning could have been 
more in line with what is typical for the science fiction genre, but Ishiguro makes this “metaphor 
for the human condition” by focusing on the intimate and personal instead of on politics at a 
global scale. Hailsham and the England that surrounds it is a familiar place, although set apart by 
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the slim shadow of a medical revolution, in constant but subtle contact with the banality of 
human life; overall Never Let Me Go is more melancholic than fantastical. 
 In Ishiguro’s parallel England, set sometime in the late 1990s or early 2000s, clones are 
engineered, raised (typically in cruel conditions) to adulthood, and then inevitably the clones 
begin the process of donating organs to “normal” human beings in need of medical intervention 
and care. There is no narrative focus on the technological aspects of this process and no 
explanation of how it is meant to work. There is no radicalism either—even the “radicals” in 
Never Let Me Go, the founders of the Hailsham project, have long given up the ghost by the time 
the narrating character, Hailsham student and “carer” Kathy H., are told the truth about the 
reality of the unbalanced relationship between clones and normal people as an adult near the 
conclusion of the novel. The clones follow through with their social duty given the paucity of 
possibilities, and though this may distress the reader the choice to move along the course is what 
makes the clones the most human of all. 
Critical Responses  
 Following the debut of Never Let Me Go, the novel generated a discussion surrounding 
contemporary bioethics, ultimately leading to conversations around the importance and 
sacredness of personal autonomy and individual freedom. It is undeniably appealing to focus on 
the biopolitical implications of Never Let Me Go—critical scholarship from Bruce Jennings , 1
Mark Jerng, and others convincingly and adeptly explore the topic as presented by Ishiguro 
within the greater contemporary biopolitical conversation around these issues. However, as Lev 
Grossman writes in his review of the novel for Time: “[The novel] could easily be mistaken for a 
 “Biopower and the Liberationist Romance.” Hastings Center Report vol. 40, no. 4, 2010, pp. 16-19, 1
Project Muse, doi: 10.1353/hcr.0.0284.
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work of bioethics, or a genre thriller, but it’s more than either of these: Never Let Me Go is an 
existential waltz, set to the music of hopelessness, about ordinary people trying to wring some 
joy out of life before it ends, and trying not to flinch when the axe falls” (“Never Let Me Go”). 
 Both Grossman’s and Ishiguro’s own statements on the novel emphasize the constraints 
on life that are a consequence of the finite and brutal quality of time, with the conceit of cloning 
amplifying the “end” of life as the moment of losing vital organs is always looming on the 
Hailsham students’ horizons, coloring their otherwise average and pointedly non-special 
experience of “growing up,” making and breaking friendships, and falling in and out of romantic 
love. Ishiguro’s unique approach to the theme of death leads some critics to draw comparisons to 
the absurdists; for The Nation, Claire Messud writes: “As in Beckett, Ishiguro’s characters, in 
their detailed world, show us a version of our own minute preoccupations and piddling 
distractions, and raise life’s largest questions for us all. Is this all there is? Must it end so soon? 
Why strive? Why persist? What is it all for?” (“Love’s Body”). In his review of the novel for the 
Guardian, John Harrison expands on Messud’s question of “why” by bringing a laser focus to 
the text’s hopeless quality: “So what is Never Let Me Go really about? It’s about the steady 
erosion of hope. It’s about repressing what you know, which is that in this life people fail one 
another, grow old and fall to pieces” (“Clone Alone”). 
 There is something deeply depressing about Never Let Me Go and the “erosion of hope” 
as Kathy H. and her fellow “students” approach the premature ends of their lives, and there’s 
something poignantly ironic about writing a thesis that can at times seem to closely mirror the 
big essays assigned  as terminal projects for Hailsham students preparing to take off for the next 2
 “We [Hailsham students] still had our essays to finish, but it was well known we didn’t really have to 2
finish them if we chose to start our training [as carers]” (Ishiguro 197-98).
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stage of their lives—as carers to donors, and then donors themselves. Among the many 
provocations in Never Let Me Go, chief among them is, perhaps simply, “Why?”—but also to an 
equal, but nihilistic, degree: “Why not?”  
 One issue that emerges for some readers is the absence of rebellion or resistance; it can 
become a bother or disappointment that the novel offers no proper revolutionaries from among 
the clones and the resistance among the general population amounts to not much more than a 
palliative attempt to increase the quality of clones’ lives. This resistance takes its form through 
the Hailsham project, which provides comfortable study in the liberal arts while the clones are 
young and their lives are still their own, even if that ownership is limited. Perhaps with other 
genre fiction  in mind, a reader might wonder: Why doesn’t Kathy try to run away? Why doesn’t 3
anyone offer up a proper fight; where are our heroes? Pushing it further, why doesn’t Kathy, or 
any other clone which Kathy knows from Hailsham, attempt or commit suicide?  
 There is a special quality to the novel that while not quite hope-inspiring does encourage 
a certain kind of holding on, sticking through and suffering the inevitable with a sturdy 
disposition. There’s a nobility in adhering to what one must do, and generating one’s own sense 
of value from doing it. Also, at any time, any single person might autonomously decide to end 
their own life, and the reasons this could happen are both endless  and ultimately irrelevant. 4
Death will happen, and the overwhelming majority of human lives culminate in a great deal of 
 Consider director Michael Bay’s 2005 film The Island, where clones of human beings discover the truth 3
of their existence—that they were created to house backup organs—and spiritedly break out of their 
confines with the help of their converted oppressors.
 Seneca famously provides an expansively open-ended argument for the voluntary termination of one’s 4
own life in Letter 70, from the Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales: “The wise man will live as long as he 
ought, not as long as he can.” For Seneca the quality of life, in his equation, is vastly more important than 
the quantity—obviously the “quality of life” being a matter of opinion. 
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nothing as far as the scope of history is concerned (for those who measure the value of a life 
lived by its potential to have a far-reaching effect on the greater world and remembered for as 
long as possible—this is not the only yardstick). Yet, every day, people choose to go on living 
despite their opinion on the quality of their lives, and the choice seems relevant—it seems to 
have greater meaning because lives are finite.  
 There is nothing more oppressive or uncompromising than the strictures of biology. 
Naturally born human beings, of course, all die—it is both completely obvious and virtually 
ignored in day-to-day existence. The weaving relationship between selfhood, death, and “hope” 
has been clearly emphasized by Ishiguro himself. “My subject matter wasn’t going to be the 
triumph of the human spirit. I was interested in the human capacity to accept what must seem 
like a limited and cruel fate,” Ishiguro stated in an interview with Michael Scott Moore and 
Michael Sontheimer for Spiegel. Ishiguro elaborates in an interview with John Freeman on Never 
Let Me Go: “What are the things you hold on to, what are the things you want to set right before 
you go? What do you regret? What are the consolations?” And perhaps most painfully for real-
world students: “And also the question is, what is all the education and culture for if you are 
going to check out?” (“Never Let Me Go: A Profile of Kazuo Ishiguro” 195).  
 Never Let Me Go complicates this issue of “human capacity” with the idea of a select 
group of privileged “students,” really generated clones, growing more and more aware of the 
inevitability of death. Critic and essayist Louis Menand sums it up in his 2005 New Yorker piece 
“There’s Something about Kathy: Ishiguro’s Quasi-Science-Fiction Novel” by saying the clones’ 
“lives are short; they know that they are doomed” (78). The fates of these clone-students are 
“limited and cruel,” with lifespans that end in their early thirties, occasionally extending into a 
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third or even fourth conscious “donation” of their body’s organs , with “completion” always 5
coming after a fourth call to donate (Ishiguro 279). 
 Ishiguro is aiming to have the story of these clones and their “doomed” position function 
allegorically for the “human condition” as Ishiguro names it, and because of this allegorical 
structuring they can be seen to show in bold type the twin awareness and ignorance of the facts 
of nature, specifically death, in our own real-world human lives. As Bruce Robbins explains in 
“Cruelty is Bad: Banality and Proximity in Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go,” this duality is 
what makes human existence bearable. “Like [Kathy] I depend for my daily dose of contentment 
on a blinkering of awareness that I myself in my better moments would find outrageous and 
repulsive” (293). Using something strange, a “clone” in this case, to examine the complex 
aspects of the “human condition”—the willingness to live despite this conscious awareness of 
“blinkering” death—complicates the question of what the “human condition” fundamentally is. 
This allegorical figure of a clone—an “other”—being representative of the “human condition” 
creates something of a paradox and evades, or even defies, comprehension. To the reader, the 
clone can begin to feel like the figure most imbued with humanity and most dignified in their 
acceptance of their own forced impermanence, while the normal humans at large demonstrate 
their failure to accept that they are “doomed” as well. By using an unethical medical process to 
try to cheat the tenets of biology and skirt the most painful aspect of the human condition—dying
—the humans become arguably more inhuman than the clones. 
 Again, Never Let Me Go does not indulge a more typical “science-fiction” curiosity about the 5
technology that allows for cloning, how these harvested organs are distributed, or whether the organs 
being removed are vital or non-vital. For some related scientific context please see the report “Cloning 
Human Beings” by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission for the U.S. President in 1997, which 
was commissioned following public anxieties surrounding “Dolly” the sheep, the first cloned mammal 
using a process called “nuclear transfer.” The report finds: “The notion of human cloning to produce 
individuals solely as organ donors is repugnant, almost unimaginable, and morally unacceptable.”
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 The clones may be allegorically figured, but the concept of a “clone” at first suggests a 
type of essential unity, being an ostensibly perfect and complete copy of a naturally occurring 
human being—think identical, monozygotic twins—but Ishiguro’s clones are separated from 
their human counterparts almost exclusively because of social difference from the world around 
them, and as a result are not considered by the world at large to be entirely “human.” This level 
of difference from “normal” humans is made explicit throughout the text via the presentation of 
the wider social perception of cloned individuals as something discomfiting, shadowy and 
unacknowledged. As Kathy explains, even from a young age the clone students at Hailsham 
“certainly knew—though not in any deep sense—that we were different from our guardians, and 
also from the normal people outside; we perhaps even know that a long way down the line there 
were donations waiting for us” (Ishiguro 69). 
 Yet the closeness of Kathy H.’s first-person, introspective narration leaves very little if 
any room for the reader to question whether Ishiguro’s clones are meaningfully distinguishable 
from humans as Ishiguro grants them a fully human intelligence and emotional depth. 
Additionally, Ishiguro does not describe any significant biological difference from a “real 
human” in the novel aside from the inability to sexually reproduce.  Thus, Never Let Me Go is 6
not a novel that is overly concerned with maintaining the line between the allegorical clone and 
what makes a real human experiencing a real human condition; any line of difference between 
the two is constantly smeared, creating a “cosy site of suspension” for the reader as well as for 
the clone characters in the novel (Ishiguro 143). In that closeness the reader identifying with the 
 Of course, a number of conditions preclude “real humans” from sexually reproducing (including 6
prepubescence) and there is no credible scientific concern that not being able to reproduce means those 
people are not really human. It also highlights the closed circle of a cloned person’s possibilities—they 
may not, or cannot, conceive of genetic or personal continuity. 
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clones can be forced to stand face-to-face with the implications of their own deaths, or a 
possibility of not being anymore.  
 Ishiguro shared during an interview with Emily Mead for Publisher’s Weekly that he 
chose to give the clones in the novel a truncated but mature lifespan as a way to magnify the 
confrontation of death and make the loss of life more potent, saying: “We all face the 
inevitability of our lives coming to an end, or of organs failing if not being removed. People 
search for something that will carry on beyond death, through art or religion or love, but 
everyone has that same fate to accept. My interest, in this book, was compressing that into 30-
odd years of three individuals’ lives” (“Future Present” 47). This “compressing” of time and the 
magnification of the universal inevitability of death for clones provide a way of looking at a 
rational awareness of one’s own temporality that is specific to Dasein. 
Heidegger’s Concept of Dasein, or “Being-in-the-world” 
 What would it mean for a clone to experience a particular philosophical acceptance and 
rational awareness of death that is often reserved for “real” human beings? The question of the 
“human-ness” of clones is complicated for the social world of the novel, but not so for the reader. 
As detailed earlier, throughout Never Let Me Go Ishiguro makes it clear that clones who donate 
their organs are not treated the same as “real” humans because they were created to fill a social, 
biomedical need; that is the only distinction in the text that separates clones from “normal 
people” and the reason clones have a unique relationship with their fixed and impending deaths. 
This manner of being aware of one’s own death was examined by the seminal German 
philosopher Martin Heidegger, who named this mortal awareness Faktizität, or “facticity;” 
according to Being and Time: “Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact; and the factuality of such a 
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Fact is what we shall call Dasein’s facticity […] The concept of ‘facticity’ implies that an entity 
‘within-the-world’ has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up 
in its own ‘destiny’ within the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own 
world” (56). 
 Before continuing to discuss the relationship between Heidegger’s concept of “facticity” 
and Ishiguro’s novel, it will be necessary to provide a foundation for bringing the concept of 
Dasein into play when thinking about the “meaning” of Never Let Me Go. What might be 
commonly considered as the idea of the “self” is reproducible by Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, 
defined as the state of “being:” “Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other 
entities. Rather it is ontologically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an 
issue for it” (32).  
 Frankly, Heidegger’s philosophical writing has a reputation for being almost mystical in 
its density; to compound the difficulty English-speaking readers are relegated to reading though 
translation. Simply stated, Dasein refers to a “being there,” to existence—we as humans do not 
possess Dasein but are in Dasein, and we each are Dasein because each of us has a way to exist 
in time with a relation to that time in a way that is not impoverished. Heidegger’s term is helpful 
here because it allows for a way to render an understanding of the “human condition” as it is 
illustrated in Never Let Me Go that is more specific than something like “subject” or “rational 
animal,” and possesses ample room to include both “normal” humans and the human clones in 
the novel in a shared designation. For Heidegger, the “human condition” is distinct among life 
forms in that humans find themselves placed in environments filled with particular objects and 
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tools, wrapped up in the course of particular goals and schemes, both of which culminate in and 
emerge from the situational total of those tools, goals, and schemes. 
 As discussed earlier, the clones in Never Let Me Go are relegated to an “other-than-
human” classification by their larger society because they perform an instrumental function in 
the larger socio-political structure of Ishiguro’s biotechnologically distinct, parallel version of 
contemporary England. However, their ability to illustrate for the reader a deep and magnified 
sense of the human condition because of that limitation on their realities as clones assigns them 
too a Dasein; they might not be human “socially” but the clones definitely are not in an Object 
category as Objects (in Heidegger’s formulation in Being and Time) cannot relate themselves to 
Being—Kathy and the other clones are not like plates, for example, as a plate can never 
“comport itself towards its Being as its own most possibility” (68).  
 According to Heidegger, while human beings have the ability to experience their own 
finite nature, other entities have an impairment; animals may have a sense of their mortality and 
their dying but the understanding is presumed to be lesser. In Heidegger’s ontology, animals exist 
in an impoverished state because animals cannot transcend their immediate needs. In 
Heidegger’s lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, he argues 
anthropocentrically and hierarchically that Dasein is weltbildend, or “world forming” while 
objects are “worldless” or weltos and animals are weltarm, or "poor in the world” (184). 
  Even though socially clones exist to perform a function and are denied the same status as 
“normal” human beings, the clones are still not reasonably viewed as “object” or “animal.”  
Daniel Vorhaus notes in his review of the novel for The American Journal of Bioethics that by 
the time the novel becomes direct with the reader on the status of the characters as clones, it’s 
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“too late” to formulate reasons why they cannot be considered human beings: “[Ishiguro’s] 
clones have already established themselves as ordinary people. They laugh, cry, squabble, 
reconcile, grow older and, ultimately, they fall in love. While Ishiguro’s tale has an unmistakable 
air of science fiction to it, it is difficult for the reader to view its protagonists as anything other 
than remarkably normal” (99). For the reader, this “remarkable” normality in combination with 
the fact that the clones know that they will not live past their thirties further orients the clones 
away from the category of “animal” which would experience the world in a state of “poverty,” or 
“poor in the world.”  
 The clones know their deaths, and knowing death is a possibility is a “second-order” level 
of conscious presence, following Charles Peirce’s categories of firstness, secondness, and 
thirdness where secondness is the first level where humans register, because reason first appears 
in that second category level (Peirce on Signs 180-203). This second-order tier of consciousness 
as human-exclusive would mean that “being-there,” or Dasein, is human-exclusive as well. In 
Never Let Me Go, clones are marked as “other-than-human” socially but are specifically seen 
breaking the membrane of this particular exclusivity, and one way that Ishiguro accomplishes 
this is through the relationship between the narrator Kathy H. and the reader. 
 Never Let Me Go could be described as a first-person memory novel, with Kathy H. 
remembering and narrating her lived experiences as a clone who is preparing to begin donating 
her organs as she recalls them, which creates by the fact of its difference from the “normal” 
human experience the allegorical device—the allegory of a group of humans beings, albeit 
created with an ethically uncomfortable mortal fate, who do not resist their inevitable and 
abjectly cruel destinies. This abhorrence or irritation for the reader comes as a reaction to the 
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characters’ seeming resignation to their prescribed purpose, that they do what they are meant to 
do and “complete” as the novel delicately calls it when clones die from the process of donating, 
without fighting in an instantly or typically recognizable way. James Butcher writes in Lancet: 
“Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the book is the stoicism with which the clones face their 
fate” (“A Wonderful Donation” 1299). He elaborates by saying that the clones are “brainwashed 
into believing that donation is the only option for them. None of them seeks to escape or avoid 
their fate […] But that is not to say that they are mindless automatons. On the contrary, these are 
people who are every bit as human as the members of the society who created them.” Ultimately, 
Butcher is indicating that there is something about the “human condition” as Ishiguro presents it 
that makes such a rebellion less than possible, and that being a fully human being does not 
preclude accepting a cruel fate. In fact, being fully human makes that acceptance possible.  
“Told and not told” 
 In order to reach an understanding of how rebellion can become impossible, it is 
important to consider the environments, structures, and experiences of the characters in the 
novel. Never Let Me Go’s Hailsham is a special liberal arts-focused boarding school for clones 
who are privileged enough to take place in its exclusive program—Kathy H. explains in the 
course of the novel that other young clones did not experience the same luxury environment, and 
according to Miss Emily and Marie-Claude at the novel’s crestfallen “climax” the poor 
treatment  of cloned children in part generated their interest in the Hailsham initiative (Ishiguro 7
260-63).  
 At times it seems the issue of how clones in the novel are treated as children in the world outside of the 7
Hailsham program is more horrifying and unspeakable than the fact that they grow to adulthood and begin 
donating. The subject is handled with the attitude that it’s simply too grisly to detail, which in turn 
highlights the insulated and overprotective Hailsham environment.
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 Ishiguro shows this exclusivity of experience through one-sided comparison. As a 
“carer,” a clone who spends a part of their early adulthood as a type of nurse and companion for 
clones who are in the process of donating, Kathy is sometimes asked by clones who grew up in 
other places to recount her experiences for them: 
 There have been times over the years when I’ve tried to leave Hailsham behind, when 
I’ve told myself I shouldn’t look back so much. But then there came a point when I just 
stopped resisting. It had to do with this particular donor I had once, in my third year as a 
carer; it was his reaction when I mentioned I was from Hailsham. He’d just come through 
his third donation, it hadn’t gone well, and he must have known he wasn’t going to make 
it. He could hardly breathe, but he looked towards me and said: “Hailsham. I bet that was 
a beautiful place.” Then the next morning, when I was making conversation to keep his 
mind off it all, and I asked where he’d grown up, he mentioned some place in Dorset and 
his face beneath the blotches went into a completely new kind of grimace. And I realized 
then how desperately he didn’t want reminded. Instead, he wanted to hear about 
Hailsham. (Ishiguro 5)   
 This is the way that Ishiguro, through Kathy H., introduces Hailsham to the reader 
complete with its guardians, student collection boxes, and the Art Room—a picture is painted of 
an overall appealing, idyllic, and progressive place to grow with guidance into a fully developed 
individual. Yet one recurrent aspect of the students’ experience at Hailsham is a conflict among 
the guardians over how direct to be with the students about their role in society as clones, that 
they will, without any deviation, grow to become donors and “complete” around the age of thirty. 
The issue is that Hailsham’s students are “told and not told” (Ishiguro 81-8) that they are clones; 
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part of the Hailsham project’s mission it to create a childhood and adolescence for clones that 
prioritizes the project leaders’ humanistic values, and their humanistic values do not provide a 
clear guide when it comes to how to present the realities of the students’ future. 
 In Chapter Seven of the novel, Kathy recounts a day that occurred when she and her 
fellow Hailsham students are about fifteen and preparing to leave the school as young adults. The 
guardian Miss Lucy overhears two boys discussing what it would “feel like if [they] became 
actors. What sort of life it would be.” Miss Lucy becomes visibly distressed by their fantasizing 
and chooses in the moment to directly and plainly address all the students present: “I know you 
don’t mean any harm. But there’s just too much talk like this. I hear it all the time, it’s been 
allowed to go on, and it’s not right.” She continues her address: 
“If no one else will talk to you,” she continued, “then I will. The problem, as I see it, is 
that you’ve been told and not told. You’ve been told, but none of you really understand, 
and I dare say, some people are quite happy to leave it that way. But I’m not. If you’re 
going to have decent lives, then you’ve got to know and know properly. None of you will 
go to America, none of you will be film stars. And none of you will be working in 
supermarkets as I heard some of you planning the other day. Your lives are set out for 
you. You’ll become adults, then before you’re old, before you’re even middle-aged, 
you’ll start to donate your vital organs. That’s what each of you was created to do. You’re 
not like the actors you watch on your videos, you’re not even like me. You were brought 
into this world for a purpose, and your futures, all of them, have been decided. So you’re 
not going to talk that way any more. You’ll be leaving Hailsham before long, preparing 
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for your first donations. You need to remember that. If you’re to have decent lives, you 
have to know who you are and what lies ahead of you, every one of you.” (Ishiguro 81)   
 Returning to Heidegger, Miss Lucy’s agitation over the issue of students being “told and 
not told” illustrates this underlying theme of the immediate experience of facticity in the novel; 
the students have this experience concretely when Miss Lucy performs this small revolt against a 
lived experience that she feels instills a false and improper sense of hopefulness and, at a more 
basic level, of normality in the students. Miss Lucy leaves nothing unclear: “Before you’re old, 
before you’re even middle-aged, you’ll start to donate your vital organs.” This claim starkly 
contrasts to the vagueness of the “unsaid,” that the students are aware of fact of donating but are 
not pressed to confront it; it is a reality that in its apparent inevitability curtails other 
possibilities. 
 Earlier in their youth, Miss Lucy struggles with restricting herself from speaking plainly 
to a young Tommy about his ultimate fate as a donor, which he recounts to Kathy: 
 “There’s something else,” he went on. “Something else she said that I can’t quite 
figure out. I was going to ask you about it. She said we weren’t being taught enough, 
something like that. 
 “Taught enough? You mean she thinks we should be studying even harder than we 
are?” 
 No, I don’t think she meant that. What she was talking about was, you know, 
about us. What’s going to happen to us one day. Donations and all that.” 
 “But we have been taught all about that,” I said. “I wonder what she meant. Does 
she think there are things we haven’t been told yet?” (Ishiguro 29) 
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 Since the students are being “told and not told,” the students are not learning something 
radically new from Miss Lucy’s protesting outburst—they know about “donations and all that” in 
a way that makes the subject banal. In fact, the subject, the “all that,” is so banal and hazy that it 
becomes dispassionate and can be framed as remote. In his profile on Ishiguro for The Guardian 
Saturday Pages, Nicholas Wroe quotes Ishiguro’s explanation of the secretive quality of their 
not-secret reality: “If information does trickle gradually it’s because the children themselves do 
not realise who they are. The reader is on a sort of parallel journey” (“Living Memories” 20). 
Leona Toker and Daniel Chertoff make the argument in their essay “Reader Response and the 
Recycling of Topoi in Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go” that the novel “subtly explores the 
educational techniques that have conditioned [the clones] to accept their predicament. These 
techniques are, to some extent, re-enacted by the narrative structure which affects the reader in 
parallel to the intellectual development of the characters” (166). Toker and Chertoff then 
conclude that this parallelism is “as if they have known this crucial fact all along but without 
knowing that they knew” (167), as the reader is brought along on the voyage from knowing to 
knowing about knowing as Kathy recounts her experiences and her relationship to her own 
situation—from the opening of the novel we know plainly that Kathy is a carer for donors who 
give their organs before dying, and that she will do this too, but it takes the entire course of 
Never Let Me Go for the reader to confront the inevitable and feel the full gravity of Kathy H.’s 
ultimate situation. 
 The consequences of being “told and not told” are an example of the softly cruel 
components of an education at Hailsham—as quoted earlier, Ishiguro is asking: “What is all the 
education and culture for if you are going to check out?” This question is obviously magnified 
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when it concerns a “Being” made exclusively for a terminal service. The novel does not give 
more than small, grimaced glimpses at the young lives of clones who did not get to go to 
Hailsham, but Hailsham can be said to provide a more humane and more humanistic intellectual 
environment with an attitude towards individual flourishing, a specific tool that at least aims to 
support the cultivation of Dasein , but in its special care and consideration it creates what 8
amounts to a disingenuous separation of the children and the reality of their inalterable position
—a porous barrier to the facticity of death that Miss Lucy seems to believe is unethical.  
 In being “told and not told,” in being given only enough information about the fact of 
their reality as socially mandated organ donors to make it commonplace and unexamined, there 
is no “hole” in the Hailsham system’s construction to escape from and launch some kind of 
rebellion—returning to Toker and Chertoff, there are “educational techniques that have 
conditioned [the clones] to accept their predicament” (166). The intentional haziness of it can 
only annoy. When Kathy’s friend and fellow Hailsham student Ruth implies that favorite 
guardian Miss Geraldine gave Ruth a special pencil case as a secret present, Kathy says: “Still, I 
hated it when Ruth hinted in this way. I was never sure, of course, if she was telling the truth, but 
since she wasn’t actually ‘telling it’, only hinting, it was never possible to challenge 
her” (Ishiguro 57). This passage replicates in small specificity the larger issue of the guardians at 
Hailsham blurring with niceties the reality of the clones’ duty to let go of their vital organs and 
die, restricting the students’ ability to challenge it. 
 This can only be speculated so far. Through Kathy’s narration the reader encounters clones who are not 8
Hailsham students, in particular Rodney and Chrissie. Both appear to be as capable of “Being-in-the-
world” as Kathy, even if they (and Hailsham student Ruth as well) occasionally appear “inauthentic” in a 
Heideggerian sense. In my view, attending liberal arts school isn’t a necessary factor of Dasein.
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 These unique experiences around the awareness of death and its facticity “hint” in their 
way at the students’ reality without offering a concrete sense what it will really be to have to 
walk towards their own deaths. This moment of being explicitly “told” by Miss Lucy is 
something of a point of no return—pretending for a moment that Never Let Me Go is a novel 
about average, “normal” people growing up and reaching adulthood, this is where to pin the 
place where a loss of innocence occurs, where children are forced to transition into something 
else, into something likely disillusioned, rebellious, or ambivalent. The novel, however, is about 
people with a specific socially imposed designation, and the society Ishiguro shows in Never Let 
Me Go establishes limits on that transition. 
“Being the spiders”—Fear and Loathing 
 There are earlier situations in the novel during Kathy’s childhood that illustrate the 
awareness of the facticity of their reality as clones with a designated purpose, far before Miss 
Lucy breaches the line between the children’s state of being “told and not told” which forces the 
students to confront directly their status as socially distinct from “normal” humans. There is a 
painful moment of awareness that arises from a childhood experiment to surprise “Madame,” 
later identified as Marie-Claude, a Hailsham founder and mysterious, remote and avoidant figure 
of authority who doesn’t seem to like to come to make the rounds. At Hailsham, the students are 
tasked with making artworks and some are chosen by Madame for her “Gallery,” as the children 
come to call it. The clone children wonder if Madame’s emotional and physical distance from 
them could be due to a fear or revulsion that she has of them, and Kathy, Ruth, and others make a 
childish game-like test of their hypothesis. When the children know Madame is due to visit 
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Hailsham, they arrange to emerge from behind a corner en masse and observe her reaction, and 
Kathy recounts: 
I’ll never forget the strange change that came over us the next instant. Until that point, 
this whole thing about Madame had been, if not a joke exactly, very much a private thing 
we’d wanted to settle among ourselves. We hadn’t thought much about how Madame 
herself, or anyone else, would come to it. What I mean is, until then, it had been a pretty 
light-hearted matter, with a bit of a dare element to it. And it wasn’t even as though 
Madame did anything other than what we predicted she’d do: she just froze and waited 
for us to pass by. She didn’t shriek, or even let out a gasp. But we were all so keenly 
tuned in to picking up her response, and that’s probably why it had such an effect on us. 
As she came to a halt, I glanced quickly at her face—as did the others, I’m sure. And I 
can still see it now, the shudder she seemed to be suppressing, the real dread that one of 
us would accidentally brush against her. And though we just kept on walking, we all felt 
it; it was like we’d walked from the sun right into the chilly shade. Ruth had been right: 
Madame was afraid of us. But she was afraid of us in the same way someone might be 
afraid of spiders. We hadn’t been ready for that. It had never occurred to us to wonder 
how we would feel, being seen like that, being the spiders. (Ishiguro 35) 
 In one sense, this scene is the first where Kathy and her fellow students are forced to see 
themselves as inarguably different from the larger group of human beings: the children were 
forced to experience how it feels “being seen like that” which leads Kathy to double and 
internalize this assessment of her “being,” of “being the spiders.” Because Madame has seen 
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them, they are as spiders. Still, the event is not a true revelation for Kathy—it began as a test of a 
theory of something that Kathy both knows and doesn’t know: 
All the same, some of it must go somewhere. It must go in, because by the time a 
moment like that comes along, there’s a part of you that’s been waiting. Maybe from as 
early as when you’re five or six, there's been a whisper going on at the back of your head, 
saying: “One day, maybe not so long from now, you’ll get to know how it feels.” So 
you’re waiting, even if you don’t quite know it, waiting for the moment when you realize 
that you are really different to them; that there are people out there, like Madame, who 
shudder at the very thought of you—of how you were brought into this world and why—
and who dread the idea of your hand brushing against theirs. The first time you glimpse 
yourself through the eyes of a person like that, it’s a cold moment. It’s like walking past a 
mirror you’ve walked past every day of your life, and suddenly it shows you something 
else, something troubling and strange. (Ishiguro 36) 
 The confrontation with Madame in the corridor is the first time Kathy sees herself 
through the specific gaze of someone who is affected by her being there, who seems afraid of her 
for what she is, which transforms her own sense of self-perception into “something troubling and 
strange.” That ungraspable whisper of truth becomes a cold and shocking touch. Bringing even 
painful truths to light by proving them can generate a masochistic pleasure and be liberating or 
exhilarating, but for the students the revelation of this proof of their position in the larger world 
results in an awareness of their difference that they do not welcome and can not easily evade. 
The students' unwillingness to truly accept or discover the reality of their creation and purpose, 
the way this makes them “different” to those who know what they are, and the way that 
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difference makes normal humans feel “afraid” necessitates a novel’s worth of narrative to travel 
to the final weighty truth of death and Kathy’s ultimate acceptance of that fact. 
 Following Heidegger in Being and Time, in order to feel fear, or das Furchtbare, it is 
necessary to have difference and for the “something” feared to have the dual qualities of 
geheuer  and proximity. If something is too distant, there is no reasonable cause to fear it or to 9
feel any potent emotion about it. When something becomes too close, it is reasonable to feel it 
may make undesirable contact: “it can reach us, and yet it may not” (180.) Simon Critchley 
writes in a series on Heidegger for The Guardian with the conveniently shared example of 
spiders: “[Heidegger’s] claim is that fear is always fear of something threatening, some particular 
thing in the world. Let's say that I am fearful of spiders. Fear has an object and when that object 
is removed, I am no longer fearful. I see a spider in the bath and I am suddenly frightened. My 
non-spider fearing friend removes the offending arachnid, I am no longer fearful” (“Being and 
Time, Part 5: Anxiety”).  
 Of course, the children are not directly analogous to spiders; they are in every physical 
way indistinguishable from normal human beings. A “normal” person, as the novel shows, has to 
know that a clone is a clone beforehand to be able to feel anxious about being in proximity with 
one. Later in Chapter Fourteen when Kathy and the other clones are young adults they take a trip 
to Norfolk, and while there they find themselves at an art gallery. The woman there, seeing a 
group of normal-looking young people around college-age, logically assumes that they are “art 
students”—which, really, they are, since that is what they’ve been up to at Hailsham. Tommy 
answers, “Not exactly […] We’re just, well, keen,” which causes the woman to “beam” at them 
 In searching for a suitable word for geheuer in English, Google Translate offered “the creeps,” which 9
does a surprisingly serviceable job of conveying the specific emotion.
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(Ishiguro 163). This moment is the inverse of the episode with Madame in the corridor after the 
children test her affectedness—this silver-haired woman sees them as art students, and the group 
collectively takes comfort in that “cosy state of suspension” of being seen absent of their 
biosocial difference. However, it is an instant of temporary reprieve from an otherwise stressful 
experience; after leaving the gallery Rodney at the front of their pack is “theatrically stretching 
out his arms, like he was exhilarated” (164) and trying to disguise the tension that resulted from 
the reason of going to the gallery in the first place—to administer another test, this time of Ruth’s 
“possible.” 
 In the world of Never Let Me Go, a “possible” is a potential genetic source for organ 
donating clones first introduced in Chapter Twelve, or as Kathy explains, “the people who might 
have been the models” (Ishiguro 139). There may not be possibles at all, or they may be cloned 
from “the gutter,” from prostitutes and drug addicts (166). The motivation for discovering 
“possibles” is complicated and individual to each clone, but the idea is that “all [the young 
clones], to varying degrees, believed that when you saw the person you were copied from, you’d 
get some insight into who you were deep down, and maybe too, you’d see something of what 
your life held in store” (140). This description makes it clear that the “possible” is also a symbol 
of a possible divergence from the course of student-carer-donor that each clone is relegated to, 
even if the possible alternative is singular and banal, like Ruth’s fantasy of possibly working in 
an office. Ruth is egged on by the other clones at the Cottages to head into Norfolk and take a 
look at her office-working “possible” in person, and after watching her through the windows of 
her office building the group follows the woman “like a gang of muggers” (161) around Norfolk 
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and enters the art gallery behind her. While the woman from the office talks the the silver-haired 
lady from the gallery, Kathy and the others observe Ruth’s “possible”:  
And as we kept listening to them, stealing the odd glance in their direction, bit by bit, but 
something started to change […] If we’d left it at seeing the woman through the glass of 
her office, even if we’d followed her through the town and lost her, we could still have 
gone back to the Cottages excited and triumphant. But now, in that gallery, the woman 
was too close, much closer than we’d ever really wanted. And the more we heard her and 
looked at her, the less she seemed like Ruth. (Ishiguro 163) 
A variation on the theme, the same feeling of unease at the extreme proximity of this “possible” 
affects Kathy and her group as it did for Madame when she got  “the creeps” from being around 
the clones when they tested her as children. Here, even though Ruth’s “possible” never pays 
attention to or addresses the group from the Cottages the group discovers that she is not Ruth, 
and they’ve gotten far “too close” to this symbol of alternatives and of normality to play pretend 
any further. Because Ruth’s “possible” is not an original of Ruth and is instead different in both 
physical presence and social designation, the experience itself generates an internal sensation of 
unease and uncomfortableness for the students about themselves and their lack of possibilities. 
For the clones, there is something “other” about “normal” humans that inspires dread, for the 
same reason of socially designated difference. 
 The contemporary term for this specific feeling of fear at the most minute of unsettling 
differences is the one used for the concept of an “uncanny valley,” coined by Masahiro Mori  in 10
his 1970 essay “The Uncanny Valley,” first published in Energy (33-5). The term is used to 
 Mori’s “The Uncanny Valley” was printed in Energy in translation by Karl MacDorman and Takashi 10
Minato.
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describe the feeling of unease and disquieting wrongness that comes from observing the minimal 
differences of high-quality, nearly indistinguishable artificiality that many people experience 
when looking at realistic CGI representations of humans, hyper-realistic sex dolls, technically 
advanced animatronic human-mimicking robots, and so on. People do not feel this aversion to 
robots that look like machines  or to toasters, even when the toaster has the ability to speak and 11
demonstrate manners. In Never Let Me Go, a variation of the experience of the “uncanny valley” 
is created not from visual distinction but from when the social difference is known to the either 
the clone or to the “normal” human and that knowledge leads to fear and loathing, as Madame 
experiences in the corridor. These children will touch Madame; they are far too close in every 
way. 
 Madame’s exhibition of fear is a result of her getting “the creeps” from the children 
because they propel her perception of them into the “uncanny valley,” but unlike a spider they 
can not be easily removed by a brave friend—these “aberrations” are irremovable from the 
biomedical situation in Madame’s world. To further outline this thesis’s particular sense of the 
formulation of the uncanny, consider Sigmund Freud’s 1919 essay “The Uncanny.” Freud begins 
by explaining that the “uncanny,” or das unheimlich, “is undoubtedly related to what is 
frightening—to what arouses dread and horror” (339). There, Freud looks at E. T. A. Hoffmann’s 
short story “The Sandman,” which in brief is about a student who falls in love with Olympia, his 
professor’s daughter—Olympia ultimately is revealed to be an automaton. Freud cites the 
position of German psychologist Ernst Jentsch’s essay “On the Psychology of the Uncanny,” in 
 After writing this section, I encountered a floor-cleaning Roomba-type robot in a grocery store that was 11
about a foot taller than me at 5’5’’, in the form of a floating black obelisk with accent LEDs. I’m unable 
to say that this completely non-human robot didn’t give me pause and make me feel like leaving its area 
as fast as possible.
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which Jentsch argues that what makes Hoffmann’s story “uncanny” is that the reader is left in a 
state of suspense, not knowing for sure whether Olympia is a “human” or not. On “The 
Sandman,” Freud writes: “The main theme of the story is, on the contrary, something different 
[than Olympia’s humanity], something which gives it its name, and which is always re-
introduced at critical moments: it is the ‘Sand Man’ who tears out children’s eyes” (348) and 
these harvested eyes are used to feed his charges, who have inhuman features.  
 There is a similarity that is uncanny in Hoffmann’s story—the parts of one set of children 
are being taken away to feed another set of children—and this uncanny reversal is also a part of 
the premise of Never Let Me Go, that organs from one group of human beings designated for the 
role are taken and given to another group of human beings in a perversion of the natural cycle of 
life. In “The Sandman,” the Sandman’s children are uncanny, and in Ishiguro’s novel the 
“normal” humans, the category “we” would fall into, are uncanny as well—the society of 
“normal” humans have to relocate their own uncanniness onto clones, which they socially 
relegate to a distant “other-than-human” position in order to justify the practice of organ 
harvesting from living bodies with complete consciousnesses. Freud, in a similar way to 
Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go, departs from Jentsch and lands on an understanding of the 
“uncanny” as coming from the themes of the larger story itself rather than the direct question of 
the personhood or human-ness of the clone characters. For Ishiguro’s novel, the fact and theme 
of the removal of organs is the site of the “uncanny” that is closer to Mori’s term for measuring 
minute but not dismissible difference and an important factor in Madame’s reactive, affective 
feeling of fear and anxiety towards the children at Hailsham. The organs will be taken, without a 
need for coercion, from these clones and given to normal humans in an unnatural but beneficial 
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perversion of that normal human’s biological lifespan—this practice is the more potent source of 
the novel’s particular type of uncanniness and the real issue of discomfort among normal humans 
towards the clone class. For Kathy, all of these direct confrontations with what is “known but not 
known,” “told and not told” at Hailsham—that the students are different, that they will die, that 
they will die for others in an ethically distasteful medical system, is a whisper that grows, then 
wanes, to a swallowed scream. 
 Hailsham students and all clones in Ishiguro’s novel must “complete,” the novel’s term 
for referring to the mandatory period of organ donation that connotes a satisfying success. This 
“completing” means that each clone will be called on to begin donating their body parts, with 
some well-performing donors surviving through second and third rounds. No clone survives past 
their fourth donation, at which time they “complete” by dying and having the remainder of their 
bodies harvested. The novel is markedly not interested in sensationalizing the physical method of 
organ harvesting and avoids completely reveling in gore or shock value to convey the horror of 
the practice. Instead, the novel’s most disturbing description comes from Hailsham alumnus 
Tommy speculating on what his own fourth donation might be like with Kathy in the final 
chapter, who at this point in the narrative is his assigned “carer” and his romantic partner: “You 
know why it is, Kath, why everyone worries so much about the fourth? It’s because they’re not 
sure they’ll really complete. If you knew for certain you’d complete, it would be easier. But they 
never tell us for sure.” Defaulting to the Hailsham-conditioned muscle memory of turning away 
from the facticity of dying and the uncanny, unfathomable anguish of “completing” in this way 
and into the comfort of being “told and not told,” Kathy, “who had been wondering for a while if 
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this would come up” answers with “It’s just a lot of rubbish, Tommy. Just talk, wild talk. It’s not 
even worth thinking about” (Ishiguro 279). 
 The thought of a Being being denied their death, suspended on the operating table, having 
the remaining pieces pulled from it with no ability to will it to stop—and all after having already 
made piecemeal of the living body—is truly horrifying to imagine and a highly magnified 
analogue for the facticity of each death each Being must confront. It is unlikely that the average 
person will see their lives end in literally this gruesome a way, but Ishiguro is magnifying the 
normal deterioration of the body in hyper-speed first by giving the clones a lifespan that ends 
around thirty, and then by having their last phase be the rapid sequential breakdown of physical 
function that all human beings experience regardless of their efforts to stay fit and 
physiologically sound. Normal humans may not be dissected while alive the way the clones in 
the novel are, but time makes piecemeal of every body in its own manner. 
 Again, these organ donations are done to clones without any need for or use of force. 
Kathy, Ruth, and Tommy are each unique individuals, illustrative of different human qualities 
and able to make unique choices and yet none choose or are compelled to mount a resistance—
this is what they are supposed to do, and that is accepted. Corporally being torn apart is the 
ultimate reward for a life of supposed to, of caring for others and donating to others; as Kathy 
explains: “A donor ‘on a fourth,’ even one who’s been pretty unpopular up till then, is created 
with special respect. Even the doctors and nurses play up to this; a donor on a fourth will go in 
for a check and be greeted by whitecoats smiling and shaking their hand” (Ishiguro 278). It may 
be a bit itchy for the reader to think that the clones come to believe as a result of their lived 
experiences that they should all “stoically” approach this fate, which Bruce Robbins 
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characterizes as a “moral obscenity” (291), without attempting to escape through revolt or 
through, perhaps less satisfyingly, suicide. 
Testing, or What We are Supposed to Do 
 Throughout Kathy’s narrative a love triangle develops between her, Tommy, and Ruth—
all Hailsham students who grow up together at the school, transfer to the Cottages together 
before advancing to caring for donors and then donating as adults. Throughout this time, all three 
are close, and as is true for all love triangles burdened with petty insults and the mishandling of 
feelings; again, Ishiguro’s approach to a story about cloning and organ donation focuses largely 
on the banalities of common life experiences—Robbins sees this banality as a consequence of 
the novel’s “welfare state” and class system, but the immediate effect of these passages for the 
reader is the removal of what Robbins calls the “blinkering of awareness” that human beings use 
to stave off an arresting sense of existential dread. They are at first all childhood classmates, then 
Ruth and Tommy become a sexual, romantic couple for a time, and then Kathy and Tommy 
become a sexual, romantic couple only after Kathy becomes Tommy’s official carer. The 
relationship is a result of their following Ruth’s encouragement after Ruth nears her own 
completion and shares her imaginative fantasy that Kathy and Tommy were supposed to have 
been together all along.  
 Ruth’s plea for Kathy and Tommy to love each other in that way that comes from a belief 
in a rumor that true love between Hailsham students can award them a chance at deferment, a 
rumor they discover during their time at the Cottages with students who grew up in other 
environments who believe that Hailsham students are special and have more possibilities 
available to them. This is why Rodney and Chrissie take Ruth to test her “possible,”  as 
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discussed earlier. The outing to Norfolk is more than a test of Ruth’s “possible;” it is really a test 
of Hailsham students and their access to the possibility of special rules. The myth of special rules 
for Hailsham students extends to whispers that there are ways to prove that two students from 
Hailsham are really, truly in love and that this proof will grant them a temporary reprieve from 
being called to donate their organs and complete in their thirties. Chrissie, another clone Kathy 
meets at the Cottages, describes this belief: 
  “We heard […] something about Hailsham students. What they were 
saying was that some Hailsham students in the past, in special circumstances, had 
managed to get a deferral. That this was something you could do if you were a 
Hailsham student. You could ask for your donations to be put back by three, even 
four years. It wasn’t easy, but just sometimes they’d let you do it. So long as you 
could convince them. So long as you qualified.” 
  “What they said,” Chrissie continued, “was that if you were a boy and a 
girl, and you were in love with each other, really, properly in love, and if you 
could show it, then the people who run Hailsham, they sorted it out for you. They 
sorted it out so you could have a few years together before you began your 
donations.” (Ishiguro 153-54) 
This fairy tale that the clones generate is reinforced by Madame’s practice of selecting choice art 
from Hailsham students for her Gallery, which the children come to believe is done as a way for 
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Madame and the guardians to measure the qualities, or the presence, of the students’ inner 
beings, their souls . 12
 The ultimate direct confrontation Kathy has with the reality of her Being as something 
viewed as “other-than-human” by the “normal” humans who will have to adhere to her 
predetermined purpose comes when she and Tommy both try their hand at being exceptional; 
they follow Ruth’s wish for them to try for a deferral. This mission in many ways resembles the 
game/test the children made of coming around the corner to surprise Madame and force her 
unfiltered reaction—here, Tommy and Kathy surprise Madame at her home without an invitation 
to try and submit their interior worth and love for each other and to ask for more time to live. 
Kathy and Tommy trail Madame like long shadows while she is out in her neighborhood, then 
(courteously) ambush her in her doorway. Kathy’s “Excuse me” causes Madame to, according to 
Kathy, “spin around like I’d thrown something at her.” Madame’s affected in the same way she 
was in Kathy’s Hailsham days: 
And as her gaze fell on us, a chill passed through me, much like the one I’d felt years ago 
that time we’d waylaid her outside the main house. Her eyes were as cold, and her face 
maybe even more severe than I remembered. I don’t know if she recognized us at that 
point; but without doubt, she saw and decided in a second what we were, because you 
 The issue of having a “soul” has undeniable religious implications that, while unendingly interesting, 12
do exceed the scope of this thesis. There is no overt mention of the religious or a religious institution in 
the text, but critics including Tiffany Tsao argue cogently that Never Let Me Go has a “deeply 
theological” nature with a lot “to say about religious life and biotechnological creation,” specifically 
concerning “religion’s ability to provide its adherents with a sense of purpose” (from the abstract for 
Tsao’s essay “The Tyranny of Purpose: Religion and Biotechnology in Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go:” 
Literature & Theology vol. 26, no. 2, June 2012, pp. 214-32, doi:10.1093/litthe/frs001. A testing or 
weighing of one’s soul at the end of their life is a theme present in the larger part of known religions as 
well.
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could see her stiffen—as if a pair of large spiders was set to crawl in the setting sun. 
(Ishiguro 248)  
 Tommy and Kathy explain that they’ve come to prove that they are truly in love, and 
Tommy brings his mechanical animal drawings, a late proof of his “soul” that he feels will earn 
him entry into the Gallery at last and qualify him as a Being in Dasein. Of course, there is no test 
of true love and no way to defer—Robbins rightly observes that the true “proof” of the children’s 
creativity is not their art projects but the fact that they create myths and rumors about the system 
they inhabit and the world around them: “The irony, exquisitely compressed into this theology of 
provisional salvation, is that the school fails to recognize the children’s genuine creativity, which 
expresses itself not in the artwork but rather in this myth-making about the artwork and its ability 
to transform their lives” (“Cruelty is Bad” 294). The time of not knowing is decidedly ended, and 
the blinders have to come off. These revelations of the students’ belief in the test of their souls 
and their clinging to impossible rumors manifest for Madame Marie-Claude, a founder of 
Hailsham, as remorse: “Poor creatures. What did we do to you? With all our schemes and 
plans?” (Ishiguro 248). 
 When former Hailsham guardian Miss Emily joins in their discussion, the reception is 
more amiable and she is more enthusiastic to see Hailsham students in adulthood. “I think what 
we achieved merits some respect. Look at the two of you. You’ve turned out well. I’m sure you 
have much to tell me to make me proud” (Ishiguro 256). Miss Emily knows about the rumor 
among clones that deferment is possible, and so does Marie-Claude, who finds it “foolish” and 
virtually impossible to “stamp it out.” The rumor regrettably was “never true,” but after being 
pressed Miss Emily explains that the students were partially right about the purpose of their art 
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and the Gallery, and she and Marie-Claude try to explain why the Hailsham project did what it 
did for, or to, the students. The student artwork was the way to reveal “what they were like” 
inside, that they had souls “at all,” or in another way of putting it, that each student was in 
Dasein too. 
 This open admission that the students did have to prove that they had “souls” is startling 
to Kathy and Tommy, with Kathy asking: “Why did you have to prove a thing like that, Miss 
Emily? Did someone think we didn’t have souls?” For Miss Emily, Kathy’s feeling that it is a 
given that she and the other students have souls and share the status of Beings is proof positive of 
a job well done for the Hailsham project—Hailsham intended to hold back the torrential wash of 
facticity and of reality from the students there, yet ultimately they could not stop the inevitable.  
On preventing children from becoming inundated with the cruelties of being alive, Ishiguro 
shares in an interview with Tim Adams for The Observer: “When you become a parent, or a 
teacher, you turn into a manager of this whole system. You become the person controlling the 
bubble of innocence around a child, regulating it. All children have to be deceived if they are to 
grow up without trauma” (“For Me, England is a Mythical Place” 17). Death and the facticity of 
dying is a trauma that no one can be sheltered from forever. 
 In director Mamoru Oshii’s 1995 film adaptation of Masamune Shirow’s manga series 
Ghost in the Shell, Major Motoko Kusanagi, a human being with a completely cybernetic body, 
tells her relatively more human partner Batou in angst: “But that’s just it, that’s the only thing 
that makes me feel human. The way I’m treated.” This same idea applies to the clone students at 
Hailsham as well—they feel they are human, that they have souls, because that is how they are 
treated at Hailsham. They are treated normally when the silver-haired woman takes them for art 
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students, and in that moment they remember being treated like humans at Hailsham by the 
majority of the guardians and accept the comfort of wearing blinkers after the anxious awareness 
of difference they experience when Ruth’s “possible” is proven to be false. It takes the clones 
testing their environment and the authority figures that inhabit it to see behind the treatment they 
receive as children to the truth of their position in society, that they are considered things “less 
than human” by “normal” humans to justify the perverse but indispensable practice of organ 
harvesting. 
 The students, as Miss Emily sees it, should be content with their curated experiences and 
the way they’ve been treated: “You’ve had good lives, you’re educated and cultured,” she tells 
the empty-handed Kathy and Tommy. Importantly, Hailsham has not blessed them with an 
indisputable humanity, it only made it possible for clones to “grow to be as sensitive and 
intelligent as any ordinary human being”—to feel like a human being for a time—where before 
they were perceived socially as “shadowy objects in test tubes” (Ishiguro 261), an equation that 
ultimately reinforces their perceived difference. By the time society began to ask whether 
cloning and organ harvesting were ethically or morally permissible, the benefits of that scientific 
advancement were too hard to let go of, and the uncanny quality of the process of taking organs 
from clones forced a perception of clones as distinctly “less than human” (263) that is 
ideologically necessary if the biomedical practice is to continue. 
 The Gallery of student artwork is the core of the test Hailsham’s founders are playing at, 
a reversal of the students’ childhood game-like provocation of Madame that seeks to prove 
whether clones possess a soul—a way of distinguishing a fundamental quality of humanity that 
assigns the students Dasein. However, the Hailsham experiment is irrevocably flawed from its 
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inception. Combining the students’ art and experiences to prove they are each in Dasein 
ultimately, if successful, delegitimizes the entire practice of cloning and organ harvesting 
altogether—the beneficial biological advancement becomes much more clearly undeniably 
“repugnant, almost unimaginable, and morally unacceptable” (National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission, “Cloning Human Beings” 30). But who among those assigned souls by accident of 
being naturally born would want to give up such a monumental biomedical achievement, 
particularly after the fact? Miss Emily asks Kathy: “How can you ask a world that has come to 
regard cancer as curable, how can you ask such a world to put away that cure, to go back to the 
dark days ?” (Ishiguro 263). This test is by its well-meaning but flawed design impossible to 13
pass. 
Death and The Law of Un-equivalent Exchange 
 As Marie-Claude explains, the biotechnological advancements in the novel’s version of  
England make it possible for the practice of cloning to solve sundry medical issues and extend 
the human lifespan beyond its current limitations, but clones do not die instead of their 
counterparts in a one-to-one exchange—mortality is a reality for everyone. Death remains an 
incontrovertible force. As Jaques Derrida explains in The Gift of Death:  
If something radically impossible is to be conceived of—and everything derives its sense 
from this impossibility—it is indeed dying for the other in the sense of dying in the place 
of the other. I can give the other everything except immortality, except this dying for her 
to the extent of dying in the place of her and so freeing her from her own death. I can die 
 This recalls Kathy’s experience with testing Madame’s fear of her in her youth, as Kathy remarks that 13
“it was like we’d walked from the sun right into the chilly shade.” Additionally, Kathy describes her “last 
years” at Hailsham, after Miss Lucy tells them frankly about the raw truth of their purpose, as feeling 
“darker,” “like day moving into night” (Ishiguro 77). 
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for the other in a situation where my death gives him a little longer to live, I can save 
someone by throwing myself in the water or fire in order to temporarily snatch him from 
the jaws of death, I can give her my heart in the literal or figurative sense in order to 
assure her of a certain longevity. But I cannot die in her place, I cannot give her my life in 
exchange for her death. (43) 
 In saying that “everything derives its sense from this impossibility,” of the inability to 
exchange mortality for immortality, this passage of Derrida’s facilitates an understanding of the 
complicated paradox of separating life’s inherent value and life’s conditional value that Never 
Let Me Go examines. The conditional value of the lives of clones, whom Miss Emily describes 
as “kept in the shadows” and after the collapse of the Hailsham experiment  “wanted […] back in 
the shadows,” throws a wash of light onto the facticity of death, and in turn on the conditional 
value of our own human lives, which, following Seneca’s equation in Letter 70, are always 
mortal and under threat of being personally or socially devalued. Whenever light is cast on its 
object, the bright clarity exaggerates the object’s shadow behind it. 
 Having stared at the truth, of her situation as a clone and the special facticity of her death 
and purpose, what is left for Kathy or for any clone to do? In Never Let Me Go, the default 
course is duty, what she and the other Hailsham students and all clones are supposed to do. 
Ishiguro told Jeff Giles in an interview for Newsweek: “Not only do [the clones] not want to 
escape, but they feel a sense of duty […] They want to be good donors, just like we all want to be 
good postmen or writers or whatever. I think that’s what I found touching and admirable and sad 
about people in general” (“Like Lambs to Slaughter”). Further, in an interview for The Atlantic 
Jennie Rothenberg Gritz asks Ishiguro about the lack of resistance in the novel, posting out that 
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after leaving for the Cottages the clones have seemingly no unbreakable restrictions on their 
activities or movements—they can drive cars as they please and can even have sexual 
relationships with other people, clones or “normal” humans with the only condition being that 
clones have to be careful who [they] have sex with” (Ishiguro 84) because normal humans are 
believed to be more emotional about the act (Kathy thinks this is mostly to do with the issue of 
reproduction but it’s also likely that it’s got a lot to do with “normal” people not being able to tell 
clones are clones unless they’re told and potentially feeling misled). Ishiguro shares:  
In most clone stories I’ve come across, the clones are used as a metaphor for slavery or 
an underclass that has been exploited. Usually that exploited class rebels […] I didn’t 
want this story to be about slavery or exploitation. So I created a world in which, 
peculiarly, nobody expects them to rebel. They actually feel a sense of dignity in carrying 
out their duties well. It’s important to Kathy that she’s a good caretaker. It’s important to 
Tommy that he’s a good donor. I find that more interesting and more sad. And I think 
that’s more like what we are. (“Myths and Metaphors”) 
Mark Jerng also takes up the complex question of dignity in his essay “Giving Form To Life: 
Cloning and Narrative Expectations of the Human”—with an absence of alternative choices, 
clones do not try to conceive new possibilities by breaking the rules in an effort to steal a claim 
to Dasein or an unwritten future though what he calls “the narrative trajectory of individuation” 
that might inspire rebellion or refusal: 
It is not that Ishiguro fails to portray these clones as human; rather, he writes a 
story that reverses the narrative trajectory of individuation. Ishiguro does not 
reveal the human as unfolding and developing from a given inert potentiality. This 
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is a much more disturbing story because it withholds the reader’s desire for 
emancipation: the clones do not rebel and thus “become human.” Rather, they 
learn to make sense of their lives as clones. In this way, Never Let Me Go disrupts 
the narrative of individuation and the values placed on the mysteriousness of 
birth, the “giftedness” of life, and wholeness. The novel takes up the question that 
challenges our privileged narratives of humanness: how is a life that is not “born” 
in the usual sense given form and dignity? By disrupting the narrative trajectory 
of individuation, Ishiguro gives us the imaginative potential of shining our 
expectations of the form of humanity. (382-83) 
 Jerng’s assessment of Ishiguro’s disruption of the “narrative trajectory” forces the annoyed 
reader waiting for the act of resistance to reconsider: Why would the reader even expect one? 
The novel holds the single narrative of one intentionally ordinary young woman— as Valerie 
Sayers notes in Commonweal: “In order to reflect Kathy H.’s ordinariness, Ishiguro here employs 
a style more matter-of-fact than in his other novels; the language flatter and more 
workaday” (“Spare Parts” 27)—to be capacious enough to have room for grand actions that can 
force a disruptive shift, by herself, in a social order that is structured to prohibit reformation? 
What could reasonably come of it? Discussing Ishiguro’s narrative choice to give Kathy the 
“syntax of ‘muddling-through’” that reveals the fortitude of the institutional “welfare state” of 
the novel and its examination of class and upward mobility, Bruce Robbins writes: “Kathy’s 
brisk efficiency leaves no space for surprise at the fact that there are recovery rooms [for donors, 
which Kathy finds “comfortable”]; that recovery rooms exist in the first place only because of 
‘donations’; that the existence of donations and recovery rooms signals a suffering that is beyond 
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any possible compensation” (296). For Robbins, the systemic oppressiveness of cloning, caring, 
donating, and redistributing organs is so well-founded in the novel’s world that Kathy is 
imprisoned by its rules, even down to the level of her own language. At the larger sociopolitical 
scale, even the rebellious corporate efforts of the Hailsham Initiative, an institution with a rival 
philosophy, have greater but still severely limited potential to force some fundamental change, 
and that initiative failed to do so within the diegetic text. In fact the social hierarchy of normal 
humans and socially designated “other-than-human” clones is reinforced after the Hailsham 
initiative fails; special schools for clones are closed and the issue of humane treatment for clones 
is dropped—the system continues in its most apathetic form. 
 Suicide remains a completely logical option, but the tools given by and the environment 
engineered at Hailsham create a situation that omits the self-terminating impulse. Hailsham’s 
guardians by careful omission “lied to [and] fooled” the students to create an environment that 
conceals the inevitable so the students will participate in the art and writing, the lessons—“Why 
should you have done [your projects],” Miss Emily asks, “knowing what lay in store for each of 
you? You would have told us it was all pointless, and how could we have argued with you? So 
[Miss Lucy] had to go” (Ishiguro 268). Hailsham is hinged on a complicated equation where the 
innate, “sacred” value of the students’ lives and the conditional value they have as healthy clones 
are frequently incompatible, and in both cases a suicide that results from either apathy or extreme 
agency causes both poles of the value system to come apart.  
 It remains only hypothetical what could have been different had Miss Lucy not broken 
the system of telling and not telling, but Kathy recounts that after that instance the general mood 
does change: “In my memory my life at Hailsham falls into two distinct chunks: this last era, and 
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everything that came before. The earlier years […] tend to blur into each other as a kind of 
golden time […] but those last years feel different” (Ishiguro 77). Still, there is no out-loud 
resistance in the place Miss Lucy cleared where it could have grown. The “different,” darker 
feeling at Hailsham after they are plainly told leads Kathy to look “in a new light” at things about 
Miss Lucy and about Hailsham at large. The first peculiarity that Kathy notices is the novel’s 
sole reference to suicide—an act that while just as final as “completion” avoids the suffering, 
pain, and the potential of an uncanny non-separation during a third or fourth donation. Kathy 
remembers: 
We’d been looking at some poetry, but had somehow drifted onto talking about soldiers 
in World War Two being kept in prison camps. One of the boys asked if the fences around 
the camps had been electrified, and then someone else had said how strange it must have 
been, living in a place like that, where you could commit suicide any time you liked just 
by touching a fence. This might have been a serious point, but the rest of us thought it 
pretty funny.” The students then play at mock electrocutions, which cause Miss Lucy to 
turn “ghostly” and say in a whisper, “It’s just as well the fences at Hailsham aren’t 
electrified. You get terrible accidents sometimes” (Ishiguro 78). 
 It is worth noting that the students don’t sense any direct comparison or identify a 
striking difference to their own experience and environment at Hailsham and the internment of 
World War Two prisoners; also, the geheuer of dying via such a horrifying suicide doesn’t affect 
them the way the idea of clones carrying out this means of suicide affects Miss Lucy. It is not the 
case that Miss Lucy is so pragmatically oriented that she balks at the possibility of lost 
biomedical value should Hailsham students begin offing themselves—she dissents, but as a 
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member of Hailsham’s guardians, she surely holds a deep ethical belief in their “right” to a 
humane upbringing, and the world for clones outside Hailsham who are always “told” and never 
cared for perhaps sees clones choose suicide often, and perhaps see these suicides cause chain 
reactions that spread to “normal” humans as well.   
 Robbins posits that Kathy’s narrative style and choices are a consequence of deeply 
rooted institutional limitations, but there are instances where the children find ways to talk about 
their specific realities nihilistically instead of hopefully through myths and fairy tales. The 
students also bypass geheuer after Miss Lucy’s speech and find a way to talk about the 
impending cycle of caring and donations when Tommy rips open the skin on his elbow in 
Chapter Seven and asks Kathy to care for him. The students tease that he will “unzip” (Ishiguro 
85), lose his parts, and get in trouble—a way to talk about “unzipping” their bodies in hospitals 
to have their organs removed and their obligation to do it, in a way that doesn’t break the rules at 
Hailsham—open talk of donating is not allowed. For the students, this violation of the rules is, as 
Kathy puts it, something said to “get a laugh, to put someone off their dinner—and, I suppose—
as some way of acknowledging what was in front of us” (88). The students can talk in their own 
way to each other about their purpose of donating in a manner that is safe because it mixes 
humor in with the uncanny and grotesque, but it also shows how seriously the students take the 
preservation of their bodies and how deep their sense of duty runs—Tommy knows that failing in 
his duty to carry his organs in a healthy state so he may give them to someone else would be 
shameful, and creates a disinterest in suicide because its antithetical to their socially enforced 
sense of honor and success in donating. 
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 This lean towards the established ideas of proper behavior, self-preservation, rule-
following, and a disinterest (but not disgust) in self-termination are all indications that the clones 
are committed to fulfilling their assigned purpose of dying for unknown others, but there are 
moments where the Hailsham students do consider their “legal” options. The difference is that 
they weigh the options that they come to believe are possible through the system of rules that 
they inhabit—not through escape, violence, or protest. These tests—namely the test of true love 
that can grant deferrals—are within the rules so far as Kathy, Tommy, and Ruth understand them. 
Far away from suicide, the clones are testing whether they might live a bit longer, or testing 
whether there is a test at all. 
 Options that are not really feasible are toyed with but ultimately, and bitterly, dropped, 
like the chance Ruth gets to examine her office-worker “possible.” These small ventures outside 
the boundaries—to break the rules and visit a clone who has “graduated” to the carer role, to get 
within reach to test the possibility of Ruth’s possible—are at the end insignificant as they lead to 
nothing nor bear any disciplinary consequences. What is shown in the episodes of Ruth’s 
imaginative dreaming is the wall, the one that Miss Lucy reinforced at the pavilion in her speech 
about the danger of hoping for the ordinary. 
 When Ruth begins donating, Kathy and Tommy go to visit her and they return to the topic 
of Ruth’s possibilities from their time at the Cottages, and the two team up on the weakened Ruth 
to prod her about it. “‘Don’t you sometimes think,’ [Kathy] said to Ruth, ‘you should have 
looked into it more? All right, you’d have been the first. The first one any of us would have heard 
of getting to do something like that. But you might have done it. Don’t you wonder sometimes, 
what might have happened if you’d tried?’” (Ishiguro 230). 
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 Of course such a thing is impossible, and Kathy and Tommy both know. It exceeds the 
scope of their testing of what might be legally possible for them as clones; really, it is an 
impassable test of Ruth and an exploratory tug, or jerk, at their bonds to each other. At this point 
in her donations, Ruth is nearly done internally and externally and there is no reasonable 
expectation that she, at the edge of invalidism and completion, could give something so wild a 
shot. “How could I have tried? […] It’s just something I once dreamt about. That’s all” (Ishiguro 
230). The last test Ruth “knows” of is the test of true love, and in “triumph […] like when one 
person’s pointing a gun at another person [and making the] other one do all kinds of things” Ruth 
charges Kathy and Tommy to be together and to make a go at living a little longer, to prove that 
they are exceptional, to find Madame and receive special rules that open up some meagre 
possibilities—and risk failure. Never Let Me Go is a novel that looks directly at impossibility and 
the cruelty of suggesting possibilities, and Ruth’s hopeful mandate is a cruelty as well. 
“Being-towards-death” with Dignity 
 An aspect of death that can be considered through Heidegger is one’s own experience of 
the death of someone else. In the “present” of the novel, Kathy is a carer , and it is her duty to 14
care for donors while they progress towards dying. At the end of her narrative she cares for 
Tommy as well, up until he prepares for his fourth and final donation when he asks for distance 
from her. Heidegger describes a “being-towards-death” as being connected to the possibility of 
“authenticity” [Eigentlichkeit], the “ownness” [Eigen] of Dasein. Heidegger states that it is not 
 Another Heideggerian equation is that of “care,” or [Sorge]—Dasein’s Being reveals itself as care: 14
“Care, as a primordial structural totality, lies ‘before’ [vor] every tactical ‘attitude’ and ‘situation’ of 
Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori; this means that it always lies in them […] ‘Theory’ and 
‘practice are possibilities of Being for an entity whose Being must be defined as ‘care’ (Being and Time, 
227-38). “Care,” simply, is Heidegger’s ontological state of Dasein. What “care” is not is “will, wish, 
addiction, and urge,” and care is not “concern” or “welfare.”
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possible to experience one’s own death, as one only experiences their world through life, and life 
and death are forever separate. To help explain, consider Françoise Dastur in Death: An Essay on 
Finitude: “The certitude of death [for Heidegger] has of itself, such that it is not the cogito sum, 
the ‘I think, I am,’ that constitutes the true definition of Dasein’s being but, rather, sum 
moribundus, ‘I am dying,’ where only ‘moribundus,’ ‘destined for death,’ is what gives sum, ‘I 
am,’ its meaning” (49).  This equation of impossibility leads to the terminal point of  
phenomenology and of Dasein as Dasein can never contain its own death (Being and Time, 
301-2). However, acting as carer to the dying creates an experience that forces the continuous 
awareness of death, death of others and of the self. 
 For Heidegger, our understanding of philosophy is rooted by necessity in our own 
personal engagement with the world we inhabit, and he believes that the normal response to the 
contingent nature of human existence is to “flee” [Flucht] from the needling thought that one’s 
chosen way of Being is not right, or somehow untrue. Heidegger does not offer a way to 
eliminate this anxiety, because there isn’t any correct way to lead one’s life. There is however a 
possibility in authenticity, or in choosing one’s own way to be. In Being and Time, he writes that 
it takes a tremendous effort of “clearing-away concealments and obscurities [if one is to] 
discover the world in [one’s] own way” (167). This is something only a human (or an “other-
than-human”) can do—again, the dishes do not discover the world in their own way. The root of 
Dasein’s anxiety—the unassailable fact that our worlds are organized contingently and not 
planted firmly in anything essential or timeless—is also the root of Dasein’s dignity, in that 
Dasein can choose. Dasein can choose the inevitable; it can choose its supposed to, and this is 
what the clones choose to do. 
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 Being a being who is aware of the facticity of dying and understands it as an end of Being 
puts a weight on individual choices, or what makes up one’s existence. Heidegger writes that 
feeling anxious in the face of death “liberates Dasein from possibilities which ‘count for 
nothing,’ and lets [Dasein] become free for those which are authentic” (Being and Time 395). 
There is a problem of “if”—the “human condition” is marked by the wealth of strategies humans 
develop to avoid thinking about death, despite the fact that death is a guaranteed possibility: 
“Death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility” (258-59), and death is “the possibility of the 
impossibility of every way of comporting oneself towards anything” (307). The human condition 
is irrevocably intertwined with the experience of mortality and the knowledge of dying. A fuller 
“existential-ontological" explanation delineates what ways death forms Dasein’s experience of its 
world: it is non-relational, certain, indefinite, and not to be surpassed (303) with special 
permissions or privileges because death is, for living beings, non-negotiable—this is especially 
true for the novel’s clones, but serves as an allegory of the inevitability of death that affects us 
all.  
 Heidegger argues that this is an opportunity for “anticipation of death” [Vorlaufen in den 
Tod], or an authentic response towards death which “unlike inauthentic being-towards-death , 15
does not evade the fact that death is not to be outstripped; instead, anticipation frees itself for 
accepting this” (308). Heidegger is describing a running ahead into death—running ahead into 
death is, for the clones with socially predetermined lifespans in Ishiguro’s novel, a completely 
unavoidable prospect; while all human deaths are guaranteed to occur with a rising probability as 
This is different than expectation of death or waiting for death [Erwaten] which still is too possessed of 15
the actual, and death actualizes its possibility. The state of anticipating death is not inherently a morbid 
state.
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time progresses, for clones the means of dying and the relative window of death are knowable. In 
accepting this extreme temporality and running ahead into death, the authentic, anticipatory 
Being-towards-death may separate from the rule of the everyday, from the normativity of the 
“one” [das Man ]. A Dasein pointed towards death is “wrenched […] away from the ‘they,’” of 16
the everyday that propels one’s chosen course through the world and “makes manifest that all 
being-alongside the things with which we concern ourselves and all being-with-others, will fail 
us when our ownmost ability to be is the issue” (308). For Heidegger in Being and Time, “Death 
lays claim to [Dasein] as an individual and “individualizes Dasein down to itself”—death’s non-
relational quality means that the bonds that tie one’s self to others are severed, and anxiety in the 
face of death in this equation brings “an unshakable joy” (358) because this fact of dying bears 
the weight and the meaning of the total sum of an individual’s choices with a value that is 
uniquely determined. 
 Death and Being-towards-death in Heidegger’s equation is an individual endeavor, but 
Kathy’s role as a carer complicates Dasein’s total singularity in moving towards death by 
exploring the duality of “care,” how each Dasein is confronted with the shade of the knowledge 
of death from the death of others. Kathy is aware that the challenge of caring is the constant 
witness of the suffering and death of her fellow clones, a suffering and death she will soon 
endure herself. For Jerng, care becomes important in that it “locates the grounds for a full 
realization of the human as properties within the individual.” He explains: “Whereas the moment 
of separation—from parents, from school, from immaturity—is often used to mark the 
individuality […] this novel’s resistance to an arc of separation marks the clone’s personhood as 
 In German, “das Man” is an indefinite pronoun; in English: “They say,” “One must,” “That’s what one 16
does.”
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real and realized only through the relationships in which it is held—if this is realized at all (386). 
Jerng’s assessment is that “care,” Dasein’s ontological state, is also observable through the 
necessity of caring for and being in confrontation with others. Robbins compounds this by 
stating that “cruelty is not indistinguishable from caring,” indicating the necessity of Jerng’s 
“confrontation.” “It’s only by being cruel to Tommy that Kathy can lovingly hold open the 
possibility of an aspiration (however theoretical) that he would be allowed to enjoy. From this 
perspective, caring, even love itself, would necessarily have cruelty in it” (Cruelty is Bad 300). 
For Kathy, caring and attachment are extremely important all the way to her choice to begin her 
transition into donating, even when that care requires “cruelty”—the same sort of well-meaning 
“cruelty” that Hailsham also cannot avoid in caring for their students as children. 
 To be “Being-in-the-world,” Dasein must be in a state where “it can understand itself as 
bound up in its own ‘destiny’ within the Being of those entities which it encounters within its 
own world” (Being and Time 56)—Kathy as carer is the most “bound up” in the “destiny”—the 
dying the from loss of vital organs—of others like her, and her activities are largely activities for 
others, done very closely with those others. By being with them as they move towards death, 
Kathy becomes acquainted with her own dying. “Being-with,” Heidegger writes in Being and 
Time, “is an existential constituent of being-in-the-world […] So far as Dasein is at all, it has 
being-with-one-another as its kind of being” (163). In the everyday sense of Being-with, of being 
part of the “they,” and Dasein is relegated to living how one should, how one is supposed to. 
“The world of Dasein is a with-world” (155). Hailsham creates a “with-world” of art and 
introspection, of walls and of tests that can’t be passed; of cruelty in caring that in its 
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discomfiting proximity allows a Being-with that breaks a rule and never fully lets go of its 
relational attachments as it runs ahead of death.  
Meaning, Dying and Time 
 More than anything, and despite the inevitable cruelties that come from the extreme 
closeness of Being-with for clones through caring, clones manifest for themselves a personal 
sense of dignity not out of what they do for society biomedically as an assigned obligation, but in 
how they wear their responsibilities lightly for each other, how they all care for each other and 
permit room for possibilities in their world of hard impossibilities. An authentic being-towards-
death generates a freedom that is not freedom from what must happen; being-towards-death 
grants a freedom to affirm the meaning of one’s own life in advance of the mortal necessity of 
dying, to weigh a life lived according to the confines of its limited choices, no matter how few. 
 For Heidegger, the only authentic death is one’s own death— the deaths of others are 
secondary to one’s own death. But in closeness, in the state of Being-with, death can touch 
Dasein first in the deaths of others, and Kathy as a carer experiences the fact of death through 
donors (which include her closest friends Tommy and Ruth) first. There is the risk at coming 
apart in the face of the deaths of others, in the screamed anguish that it can generate, and that 
first relation to death is separate from an anxiety over the fact of one’s own death.  
 After Kathy and Tommy discover that the test of their love and of their souls is 
impossible to pass, and worse, never existed, Tommy breaks down in a show of temperament and 
screams out in the “blackness”, “raging, shouting, flinging his fists and kicking out” against the 
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inevitable truths that Kathy had first perceived as a whisper , there in the mud. Kathy holds him; 17
he and she make a late show of pretending that they will not have to let each other go, even 
though they know they do. “It seemed we were holding onto each other because that was the 
only way to stop us being swept away into the night,” (Ishiguro 274). Being-with hurts; there is 
so much at stake. Kathy as his carer does her best to “be there,” to steady Tommy in his moment 
of shattering. Tommy must donate his organs and complete. 
 This is part of what they both are supposed  to do, and what they can do well. Yet 18
Tommy never lets go of his mechanical animals, and he moves himself away from Kathy before 
his fourth donation, to wear it lightly before her, and to spare her the risk of breaking apart at the 
experience of his death relationally. To spare Kathy from the painful proximity of his death and 
to move towards the end of his life with dignity, Tommy has to move away from her and towards 
a Being-with with other donors; they are on their own stalwart advance towards no longer being, 
and he belongs with them. Tommy’s death comes, and Kathy feels through the final loss of 
Tommy that she too will have to move on from the carer role, from her supposed to of clinging to 
caring and into her supposed to of letting go. 
 Before his fourth, Tommy asks Kathy if she ever “gets tired of being a carer,” as all the 
other students in their age group have already gone on to donating and completing. “Don’t you 
 This thesis concentrates on Kathy because she is the novel’s narrator and it’s only perspective, but 17
Kathy does tell the reader that Tommy seems to have always known  “something the rest of [the students] 
didn’t” (Ishiguro 275) and was never the “idiot” at all—there is so much that must be left unsaid here 
about Tommy, his mechanical animals, his raging, and his “soul” that could not fit into this thesis.
 Kwame Anthony Appiah examines Stevens, the butler from Ishiguro’s novel Remains of the Day and 18
finds that Stevens also finds a kind of freedom in doing what he is supposed to: “Mr. Stevens serves as a 
good example of the moral power of individuality because he exemplifies it even though he doesn’t 
himself believe in liberty, equality, and fraternity. Even someone as illiberal as Mr. Stevens, that is, 
demonstrates the power of individuality as an ideal” (315-16). From “Liberalism, Individuality, and 
Identity,” Critical Inquiry vol. 27, no. 2, Winter 2001, pp. 305-32, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1344252. 
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sometimes wish, Kath, they’d hurry up and send you your notice?” In other words, isn’t it time to 
walk positively towards dying? Kathy responds by saying that “it’s important there are good 
carers. And I’m a good carer” (Ishiguro 282). But what is it all for? What can it mean? Kathy 
will have to let go, and move towards death, but letting go proves difficult even after the fact of 
loss. But letting go is a choice, and letting go of possibilities can be an “unshakable” relief, if not 
a “joy,” in the freedom from choosing. 
 Being is time, and time is cruelly limited. For the individual, for Dasein, time ends one’s 
life and brings its end, and to understand what it means to be an authentic Being one must look 
always towards its death. In confronting death directly and making it a light, a meaning can be 
made from the fact of death. For these “other-than-humans,” for Kathy, that limitedness is 
magnified—their deaths as “other-than-human" organ donors are hyper-guaranteed, which in 
turn magnifies their state of Dasein and their approach to their situation by Being-towards-death, 
by experiencing death first by Being-with and caring, and by finding a sense of freedom and 
dignity in acting within the confines of supposed to.  
 What does it all mean? The “human condition” is a condition that accumulates memories 
and turns them over, placing them here and there, creating connected narratives from the pieces 
or piling them up until they become largely indistinguishable—at the site of death, at the end of 
time, those memories and the color they take on define the life exclusively for the person who 
lived it, where they are examined, valued, and then they are let go.  
 For Kathy at the end of the novel, the only choice is compliance, but compliance is a 
dignified choice. Why not? Kathy’s life, ultimately, is as terminable as anyone’s, and despite this 
inevitable end of Being we continue to be. Kathy was a good carer and she made the journey 
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towards dying possible for those who had no choice but to make the trip; she had Hailsham and 
the guardians, she had Tommy and Ruth and the others, she had the pain of discovery and the 
experience of being-in-the-world—all this is rendered meaningful because Kathy lets go and 
moves towards her own inalienable dying, something that resisting or rebelling would only 
delay. The ultimate dignity of the human condition, for all of us humans, is its acceptance of 
death and its ability to turn towards it, walking straight.  After Kathy piles up her memories in an 
unknown place “along the fence [where] all sorts of rubbish had caught and tangled,” she says: 
“I just waited a bit, then turned back to the car, to drive off to wherever it was I was supposed to 
be” (Ishiguro 288). 
Tuohy 51
WORKS CITED 
Adams, Tim. “For Me, England is a Mythical Place.” The Observer, 20 Feb. 2005, pp. 17. 
Butcher, James. “A Wonderful Donation.” Lancet 365, 9 April 2005, pp. 1299-1300. 
Critchley, Simon. “Being and Time, Part 5: Anxiety.” The Guardian, 6 July 2009,     
 www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/06/heidegger-philosophy-being. 
Dastur, Françoise. Death: An Essay on Finitude. Translated by John Llewelyn, The    
 Athlone Press, 1996. 
Freeman, John. “Never Let Me Go: A Profile of Kazuo Ishiguro.” Conversations with Kazuo   
 Ishiguro. Edited by Brian Shaffer and Cynthia Wong, UP of Mississippi, 2008. 
Freud, Sigmund. “The Uncanny.” Art and Literature. Edited by Albert Dickinson, Penguin,   
 1990. 
Giles, Jeff. “Like Lambs to Slaughter.” Newsweek vol. 145, no. 14, 4 April 2005, pp. 52. 
Grossman, Lev. “Never Let Me Go.” Top 10 Novels of the 2000s. Time Entertainment, 18 Dec.   
 2009, entertainment.time.com/2009/12/29/the-10-best-books-of-the-decade/.  
Gritz, Jennie Rothenberg. “Myths and Metaphors.” The Atlantic, 15 May 2005.     
 www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/05/myths-and-metaphors/303942/. 
Harrison, M. John. “Clone Alone.” The Guardian, 25 Feb. 2005, www.theguardian.com/books/  
 2005/feb/26/bookerprize2005.bookerprize.  
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson,   
 Harper Perennial Modern Thought, 2008. 
—-. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. Translated by   
 William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Indiana UP, 1995. 
Tuohy 52
Ishiguro, Kazuo. Never Let Me Go. Vintage International, 2005. 
Jerng, Mark. “Giving Form to Life: Cloning and Narrative Expectations of the Human.” Partial   
 Answers: Journal of Literature and the History of Ideas vol. 6, no. 2, 2008, pp. 369-93.   
 Project Muse, doi: 10.1353/pan.0.0014. 
Mead, Emily. “Future Present.” Publisher’s Weekly, 21 Jan. 2005, pp. 47. 
Menand, Louis. “There’s Something about Kathy: Ishiguro’s Quasi-Science-Fiction Novel.” New 
 Yorker vol. 81, no. 6, 2005, pp. 78. 
Messud, Claire. “Love’s Body.” The Nation, 28 April 2005, www.thenation.com/article/   
 loves-body/. 
Moore, Michael Scott and Michael Sontheimer. “Spiegel Interview with Kazuo Ishiguro.”   
 Spiegel Online, 5 Oct. 2005, www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel-interview-with-kazuo-  
 ishiguro-i-remain-fascinated-by-memory-a-378173.html. 
Mori, Masahiro. “The Uncanny Valley.” Translated by Karl MacDorman and Takashi Minato.   
 Energy vol. 7, no. 4, 1970, pp. 33-5.  
Oshii, Mamoru and Masamune Shirow. Ghost in the Shell, Manga Entertainment, 2004. 
Peirce, Charles. Peirce on Signs: Writings on Semiotic by Charles Peirce. U of North Carolina P, 
 1995. 
Robbins, Bruce. “Cruelty is Bad: Banality and Proximity in Never Let Me Go.” Novel: A Forum   
 on Fiction: Ishiguro’s Unknown Communities vol. 40, no. 3, Summer 2007, pp.    
 289-302, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40267704. 
Sayers, Valerie. “Spare Parts.” Commonweal vol. 132, no. 13, 15 July 2005, pp. 27-28. 
Tuohy 53
Seneca. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales. Letter 70. Translated by Richard M. Gummere. Vol. 2,   
 G. Putnam Sons, 1920. 
Toker, Leona and Daniel Chertoff. “Reader Response and the Recycling of Topoi in Kazuo   
 Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go.” Partial Answers: Journal of Literature and the History of   
 Ideas vol.6, no. 1, 2008, pp. 163-180, Project Muse, doi: 10.1353/pan.2008.0009. 
United States, Congress. “Cloning Human Beings: Report and Recommendations of the National 
 Bioethics Advisory Commission.” National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 1997,   
 https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/nbac/pubs/cloning1/cloning.pdf. 
Vorhaus, Daniel. “Review of Kazuo Ishiguro, Never Let Me Go.” The American Journal of   
 Bioethics vol. 7, no. 2, 2007, pp. 99. PhilPapers, doi: 10.1080/15265160601112451. 
Wong, Cynthia and Grace Crummett. “A Conversation about Life and Art with Kazuo Ishiguro.”   
 Conversations with Kazuo Ishiguro. Edited by Brian Shaffer and Cynthia Wong, UP of   
 Mississippi, 2008. 
Wroe, Nicholas. “Profile: Living Memories: Kazuo Ishiguro.” The Guardian Saturday Pages, 19  
 Feb. 2005, pp. 20.
